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Abstract
In order to cope with the increasing scarcity of ¯nal dump sites for household
wastes, the UK recently introduced an environmental policy targeted at the ¯rms
that produce and sell products that generate packaging wastes. This policy requires
such businesses to hold predetermined numbers of tradable credits called \Packag-
ing waste Recovery Notes" (PRNs). This article provides insights into the economic
implications of such a policy through a simple analytical model of a recyclable prod-
uct and the PRN markets. Our analysis yield two particularly interesting results.
First, an increase in the required recycling rate dampens the output and land¯ll
waste levels, while the e®ect on the level of recycling activities is ambiguous. Sec-
ond, an increase in the land¯ll tax always leads to an increase in the land¯ll waste.
We also discuss how the socially optimal land¯ll tax in the presence of the PRN
market should be chosen.
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1 Introduction
Among the EU member states, there has been a major push toward diverting wastes
away from land¯lls and promoting recycling as the concern over the shortage of land¯ll
space has been mounting for a while. Since the 1990s, the UK, whose waste management
heavily depended on land¯lls that absorbed over 80 percent of its waste (OECD, 1999),
has introduced several policy measures to reduce and recycle wastes. Among them is the
approval of tradable credits, called \Packaging waste Recovery Notes" (PRNs), to meet
individually-speci¯ed recycling obligation for ¯rms that produce and sell products that
generate packaging wastes. The PRNs are issued by accredited reprocessors according to
the amount of waste actually recycled, and traded among regulated ¯rms and recyclers
in an open market.
In this paper, we construct a simple analytical model of a product market and the
PRN market so as to gain insights into this new policy instrument. Particularly, we
conduct a series of comparative statics analysis to examine, ¯rst, how an increase in a
target recycling rate a®ects the equilibrium recycling and land¯ll waste levels. Another
policy e®ect we explore is that of an increase in the land¯ll tax, which is simultaneously
implemented in the UK. There are two notable results from our comparative statics
analysis. First, an increase in the required recycling rate dampens the output and land¯ll
waste levels, while the e®ect on the recycling activity is ambiguous, partly due to the
existence of the PRN market. Second, an increase in the land¯ll tax (or the the price of
recycled material) actually raises the amount of land¯ll waste. In particular, as it becomes
increasingly di±cult to raise the recycling rate further, a constant rise in the land¯ll tax
can start exacerbating the shortage of land¯ll sites. This result at least casts some doubt
on the e®ectiveness of implementing the PRN scheme and land¯ll tax concurrently, as is
recently practiced in the UK.
After describing the PRN scheme and other relevant policy environment in the UK
in the next section, we present the structure of our model in section 3. In section 4, we
conduct a series of comparative statics analysis in order to examine how the equilibrium
outcomes react to marginal changes in respective policy instruments. In section 5, we
brie°y discuss how the socially optimal level of the land¯ll tax needs to be adjusted to a
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change in the social cost of land¯ll waste.
2 Background Information
Waste management of the UK has been largely driven by the EU Directives' objectives
and targets. In 1994, the EU council issued the Directive 94/62/EC that required mem-
ber states to pass legislation at the national level to reduce packaging waste. Since 1997,
the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations (PWRegs) has
regulated businesses with an annual handling of more than 50 tonnes of packaging or
annual turnover of more than $2 million. This covers close to 90 percent of all packag-
ing handled by UK businesses (Department for Environment, Food, and Rural A®airs
(Defra), 2006a).
In large, there are three types of agents regulated under the PWRegs: output produc-
ers and retailers, reprocessors/recyclers, and \compliance schemes". Compliance schemes
act as middlemen between the ¯rst two types of agents, and guarantee to output pro-
ducers and retailers that required amounts of recycling of packaging materials have been
achieved by contracted reprocessors.1 The PWRegs speci¯es the materials covered, distri-
bution of recycling obligations across business categories, and calculation rules to derive
their required amounts of recycling based on the scale of their business activities.2
The novelty of this regulation is the introduction of tradable credits to meet recy-
cling obligation, called Packaging waste Recovery Notes (PRNs). PRNs are issued by
accredited reprocessors according to the amount of waste actually recycled, and are the
standardized form of evidence of recycling of packaging waste under the PWRegs.3 At
the end of each regulatory period, each output producer must hold enough PRNs for each
of the six regulated materials used for packaging (glass, paper/board, aluminum, steel,
plastic, and wood) to comply with the recycling requirements (1 unit of PRN corresponds
to 1 tonne of a material recycled).
1 Thus, compliance schemes essentially serve the same functions as Producer Responsibility Organi-
zations in other European nations (Walls, 2006).
2 For details, see Salmon (2002), Walls (2006), and Defra (2006a).
3 Another form of standardized evidence of recycling under the PWRegs is Packaging waste Export
Recovery Notes (PERNs) issued by accredited exporters of packaging materials. In our analysis, we do
not make a distinction between PRNs and PERNs for simplicity.
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The initial issue of PRNs are usually based on long-term contracts between compli-
ance schemes and reprocessors. PRNs can also be traded in the open market called the
Environment Exchange (a.k.a. t2e) to ¯ll the gap between the secured holdings and the
required amounts given the actual amount of packaging handled.4 Since its launching,
the volume of annual PRN trading increased from less than 100,000 tonnes in 1998 to
over one million tonnes in 2009 (Table 1).5 In terms of a percentage of the total packag-
ing wastes recycled, the volume of trade in this secondary market grew from less than 1
percent in 1998 to over 8 percent in 2004, and more recently 12.5 percent in 2009.6
The achievement of packaging waste recycling e®ort of the UK in recent years is quite
remarkable. The UK has moved well beyond the 30% recycling rate in late 1990s to meet
the EU Directive's recycling targets (Defra, 2009). The recycling rate is currently just
above 60%. Among the EU nations, the UK recently ranks towards the middle of the
rankings of the amount of packaging used per person and the packaging recycling rate
(ACP, 2008).
Besides the targets set by the (revised) EUWaste Framework Directive (2008/98/EC),
the UK now must also meet the targets given by The EU Council Directive on the
land¯ll waste (1999/31/EC). The overall aim of this so-called Land¯ll Directive is to
reduce negative externalities from the land¯ll waste as much as possible (Defra, 2003).
In response, the UK introduced the Land¯ll Tax under the Finance Act of 1996. The
Land¯ll Tax applies to all waste that goes to licensed land¯ll sites, and the tax level has
been raised steadily since its introduction to the level of $48 per tonne in 2010. As we
can see in Table 1, an automatic annual increase has been built into this tax system, and
its level is expected to reach as high as $80 per tonne by 2014.
The UK government has declared that \[b]y 2050 we hope to have achieved zero
waste" (Defra, 2009). They propose that the UK should join the EU's highest-achieving
4 Unlike the SO2 allowance market under the US Acid Rain Program, participation in the PRN
market is limited to the regulated parties. Another notable di®erence from the SO2 allowances is that
PRNs are not \allowances" in the sense that they do not represent emission rights. Rather, they are
\credits" in that they represent ful¯lled abatement obligations.
5 Since 2004, PRNs and PERNs are traded in both the spot and forwards markets. The latter has
reached almost 40 per cent of the total trading volume in 2009, re°ecting participants' preferences to
lock in prices as well as the maturity of the market.
6 These rates are derived by the authors using the information on the amount of total packaging
waste recycled in 1998, 2004, and 2008, from Defra (2006b and 2010b).
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Table 1: Land¯ll Tax of the UK
Year tax per tonne
1996 $7
1999 $10, rising annual by $1 till 2004
:
:
2004 $15, rising annually by $3 from 2005
:
2007 $24, rising annually by $8 from 2008
:
2010 $48
:
2014 $80
Sources: Barrow (2003); Defra (2010a).
member states by pushing its recycling target rate to 71.9 percent by year 2020 (Defra,
2010a).
In the past ¯fteen years, the total amount of land¯lled packaging wastes has decreased
gradually, but not at such a rapid pace as is directly estimated by the constant increase
in the recycling rate (Defra, 2011). This can be attributed to a rather signi¯cant increase
in the packaging waste °ow in the UK during the same period. Defra (2011) shows that
total packaging in waste stream had risen from around 9 million tonnes per year in the
late 90's to just below 11 million tonnes towards the end of the ¯rst decade of the new
century. This implies that the issue of diminishing land¯ll sites has not been fully solved
by these policy measures and ensuing changes in the behaviors of the concerned parties.
We attempt to provide a possible explanation for this problem in the following analysis.
3 The Model
In our model there are three important agents, i.e., a consumption good producer, a
consumer and a recycler, and we assume that they all behave as price-takers.7 For the
7 Although the development of the secondary market described in the previous section is an interesting
topic, we ignore the roles of this market in our model. This omission would be innocuous in our context
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sake of simplicity, we consider only one household, one recycler and one output producer
in our model as this would not lead to any loss of generality under our setting in obtaining
the qualitative results that follow. We only deal with one type of material and do not
explicitly model the workings of the input markets.
3.1 The Behavior of an Output Producer
An output producer's objective is to maximize its pro¯t by selling a product, x. Its
production requires two distinct types of essential inputs. On one hand, it requires a
packaging material denoted by z. On the other hand, all the other necessary inputs to
produce this product are aggregated into a composite input, y. The production function
is described by the following Leontie® type:
xS = min
nz
±
; g(y)
o
; (1)
where xS denotes the supply of x and the parameter ± represents the physical amount
of the packaging material required for producing one unit of output.8 We suppose that
the function g(y) has the following properties: g0 > 0 and g00 < 0. The total cost of
production is given by Pzz + Pyy, where Pz and Py are respectively the prices of the two
inputs, z and y.9 Since the cost-minimizing ¯rm would choose xS =
z
±
= g(y), we have
z = ±xS and y = g
¡1(xS). For notational simplicity, we rede¯ne f(xS) ´ g¡1(xS) with
f 0 > 0 and f 00 > 0, given the properties of g(y) just above. Thus, we have y = f(xS) for
a cost-minimizing ¯rm.
In addition to the production cost, the ¯rm incurs a payment for obtaining the required
PRNs. The PRN scheme is introduced here in the following way. As the packaging input,
z, is the source of waste after the consumption of the output, the amount of the PRNs
that the ¯rm must hold to meet its legal obligation is set proportionally to z by the
legislation. We denote this proportion by ®(0 < ® < 1). The ¯rm must purchase the
where there is no heterogeneity within respective agents and no uncertainty is considered.
8 Hence, technological development of less packaging implies a decrease in ±. Although we do not
deal with the evolution of ± in this paper, it would be an important issue that we would like to explore
in future studies especially when the analytical framework has been gradually developed by such works
as Fullerton and Wu (1998) and Calcott and Walls (2000).
9 We assume that Pz and Py are su±ciently low so as to obtain an interior solution in the output
market.
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quantity ®z of PRNs at the price of Pn per unit. This price of a PRN is determined
endogenously in the PRN market as we describe below.
The pro¯t maximization problem of a representative output-producing ¯rm can be
expressed as:
Max
xS ; z; y
¦x = PxxS ¡ (Pzz + Pyy)¡ Pn®z: (2)
Incorporating the considerations above, (2) can be rewritten as:
Max
xS
¦x = PxxS ¡ (Pz±xS + Pyf(xs))¡ Pn®±xS: (3)
The ¯rst-order condition for this problem is given by:10
Px ¡ Pz± ¡ Pyf 0(xS)¡ Pn®± = 0; (4)
where Px is the marginal revenue, and the other terms, in total, represent the marginal
cost of production.
3.2 The Behavior of a Household
As each unit of the product contains ± units of the packaging material, household con-
sumption of x units of the product results in ±x units of packaging waste to be disposed
of. Each household uses collection services speci¯cally designed for subsequent recycling
of the waste. We suppose that the collectors of the recyclable waste are municipal govern-
ments which then provide recyclers with the recyclable waste free of charge.11 Note that
the household does not receive any monetary payment from the recycler. Also, we ignore
the physical costs of handling the recyclable waste properly as well as the opportunity
costs of those activities by the household.
With the use of a quasi-linear utility function, we consider that a representative
household's behavior is approximated by the following constrained utility maximization
problem with respect to the product demanded, xD, and a numeraire, m:
Max
xD; m
U = u(xD) +m; (5)
10 As can be easily con¯rmed, second-order conditions throughout the paper are all satistied.
11 Municipal collection service of general and recyclable garbage is quite prevalent in developed nations
(Walls, Macauley and Anderson, 2005).
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s:t: PxxD +m · I; (6)
where I is the household's total income, and u(xD) signi¯es the utility arising from
consuming xD with the following properties: u
0 > 0 and u00 < 0.
The ¯rst-order condition for the household's utility maximization problem is given
by:
u0(xD)¡ Px = 0: (7)
3.3 The Behavior of a Recycler
A recycler can process one unit of the recyclable waste it freely obtains, to create one unit
of a recycled material which can be sold at the exogenous price of Pr. We consider that, if
the government provides a recycling subsidy, it simply boosts Pr. Under the PRN scheme,
moreover, a recycler can sell the notes generated by recycling to an output producer at
the price of Pn, which is endogenously determined by the market clearing condition in
the PRN market. Hence, the marginal revenue a recycler obtains by recycling one unit of
waste is Pn + Pr. Meanwhile, the recycling activity imposes physical costs on a recycler
in sorting and processing the waste. The recycler's cost function is assumed to be c(r)
with the properties: c0 > 0 and c00 > 0. The recycler also has to dispose of the remaining
waste at a dump site, by paying the unit cost of Pl, a land¯ll tax.
12 We consider that
local governments are in charge of managing land¯ll sites, and this land¯ll tax is received
by the government to cover its operating cost. With a su±ciently high marginal cost of
recycling, a recycler will adopt this disposal option to a certain extent.
The pro¯t-maximization problem of a recycler is:
Max
r
¦r = (Pn + Pr)r ¡ Pl(z ¡ r)¡ c(r): (8)
The ¯rst-order condition is:
Pn + Pr + Pl ¡ c0(r) = 0; (9)
where the ¯rst three terms represent the marginal revenue of recycling, including the
avoided land¯ll tax, and c0(r) is the marginal cost of recycling.
12 We assume that Pl, as well as Pr, is su±ciently low in relation to the cost of recycling so as to obtain
an interior solution in the PRN market. Thus, the PRN price, Pn, is always positive in the equilibrium.
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3.4 Market Equilibrium
Finally, as both the product and PRN markets need to clear at the equilibrium, we have
the following two conditions:
xD = xS; (10)
r = ®z; (11)
where (10) is for the output market and (11) is for the PRN market.13 The market
equilibrium for the model is described by (4), (7), (9), (10) and (11).
4 Comparative Statics Analysis
In this section, we conduct a series of comparative statics analysis with respect to three
possible policy instruments. The policy variables we mainly focus on here are ®, which
signi¯es the stringency of the recycling obligation, and Pl, a land¯ll tax per unit of waste.
Also, we brie°y discuss the subsidy for recycling activities, which raises the price of the
recycled material, Pr.
Invoking z = ±x, the equilibrium conditions for the base model can be written as:
P ¤x ¡ Pz± ¡ Pyf 0(x¤)¡ P ¤n®± = 0; (12)
u0(x¤)¡ P ¤x = 0; (13)
P ¤n + Pr + Pl ¡ c0(®±x¤) = 0; (14)
where P ¤x , x
¤, and P ¤n respectively denote the equilibrium values of the output price, the
output level, and the price of PRN.
The so-called comparative statics equations and its direct results are in the Appendix.
Based on those results, we can obtain several propositions on the equilibrium amount of
land¯ll waste.
Proposition 1. An increase in the recycling rate always leads to a reduction in land¯ll
13 At the equilibrium, we cannot have r < ®z as this would violate the PRN regulation. Also we rule
out the case where r > ®z as this implies that the price of a PRN becomes zero and the producer would
be able to obtain whatever amounts of PRNs freely.
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waste.
Proof. Since the equilibrium recycling level is given by r¤ = ®z¤, the amount of land¯ll
waste is: z¤ ¡ r¤ = (1¡ ®)z¤ = (1¡ ®)±x¤. Therefore, we have:
@(z¤ ¡ r¤)
@®
= ¡±x¤ + (1¡ ®)±@x
¤
@®
: (15)
(A2) con¯rms that the sign of the R.H.S. of (15) is negative. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 suggests that raising the statutory recycling rate always reduces the land¯ll
waste successfully as an increase in ® holds down the output level and the ratio of recycling
to the total output is raised at the same time. However, its impact on the level of recycling
activities is not always positive as is con¯rmed by:
@r¤
@®
= ±x¤ + ®±
@x¤
@®
; (16)
whose sign is ambiguous given (A2). This implies that there might be a trade-o® between
encouraging recycling activities and reducing the land¯ll waste through the adjustment of
the mandatory recycling rate in the PRN system. This can pose a problem if the recycled
material commands a signi¯cant economic value. As ® does not a®ects the supply of the
recycled material as seen in (9), the equilibrium levels of r are driven solely by the demand
for the PRNs.
The following would be the most important result of our analysis:
Proposition 2. An increase in the land¯ll tax always increases the amount of land¯ll
waste.
Proof. Again using the de¯nition of land¯ll waste, we have z¤ ¡ r¤ = (1¡ ®)±x¤. Thus:
@(z¤ ¡ r¤)
@Pl
= (1¡ ®)±@x
¤
@Pl
: (17)
(A5) shows that the sign of the R.H.S. of the above equation is positive. Q.E.D.
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Intuitively, this proposition can be explained in the following way. An increase in Pl raises
the bene¯t of recycling to a recycler and consequently lowers the cost of production via
a lower P ¤n , as is con¯rmed by (A7). Thus, the production level rises, as well as the use
of the packaging material input, z. In our framework, this increase in the waste °ow
necessarily overwhelms the increase in the recycling e®ort to yield a greater amount of
land¯ll waste. Proposition 2 is in contrast with a simple assertion that an increase in the
cost of an activity will discourage such an activity. The nature of the PRN market gives
rise to this result.14
Finally, we consider the impact of an increase in the price of recycled material, Pr,
upon the amount of land¯ll waste. This increase might be due to either an increase in the
subsidy for recycling activities or a hike in the demand for the recycled material. Here,
we have:
Proposition 3. An increase in the price of the recycled material always raises the amount
of land¯ll waste.
Proof. Once again, we have z¤ ¡ r¤ = (1 ¡ ®)±x¤ for the equilibrium amount of land¯ll
waste. Thus,
@(z¤ ¡ r¤)
@Pr
= (1¡ ®)± @x
¤
@Pr
: (18)
Then, (A8) con¯rms that its sign is positive. Q.E.D.
As we can easily see from (14), an increase in the land¯ll tax and an increase in the
price of the recycled material work in the exact same way. Besides the subsidy from the
government, the latter change can be caused by the functioning of the recycled material
market, which is not explicitly modeled in this paper. When the recycled material is
valued more highly there, the amount of land¯ll waste rises, which aggravates the land¯ll
shortage.
14 It is also important that a consumer is not responsible for collection charge or any other costs in
our model. Our setup would be more plausible when there is strong concern for illegal disposal of waste
by a household, as is often the case with packaging materials.
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5 Optimal Land¯ll Tax under the PRN System
In order to gain further insights into the working of the land¯ll tax under the PRN system,
we speci¯es the three functions above as follows: g(y) = y
1
2 , u(xD) = axD ¡ 12bx2D, and
c(r) = 1
2
cr2. As our focus in this section is the desirable level of the land¯ll tax from a
social welfare perspective, we introduce the following two costs. The ¯rst is the social
cost of disposing of waste at land¯ll sites, including negative externalities at those sites.
We assume that this marginal social cost is constant at which µ. The second is associated
with the transportation of the household waste by the municipal government, whose
marginal cost is given by ´. Then, we can de¯ne the social welfare, W , as follows:
W = ¦x + U +¦r ¡ µ(1¡ ®)±x¡ ´±x+ Pl(1¡ ®)±x; (19)
where the last term is the tax revenue received by the municipal government. Given the
speci¯c functional forms above and (3), (5), (6) and (8) in section 3, the value of the
social welfare at the equilibrium, denoted by W ¤, is, after summarizing:
W ¤ = ¡(Py + 1
2
b+
1
2
c®2±2)x¤2 + fa¡ Pz± + Pr®± ¡ µ(1¡ ®)± ¡ ´±gx¤ + I: (20)
Here, we consider that the mandatory recycling rate, ®, is exogenously given as a directive
from the EU, for instance, and discuss how the social planner should choose the land¯ll
tax, Pl, to maximize W
¤.
The ¯rst-order condition of the maximization of W ¤ with respect to Pl is:
@W ¤
@Pl
= ¡(2Py + b+ c®2±2)x¤@x
¤
@Pl
+ fa¡ Pz± + Pr®± ¡ µ(1¡ ®)± ¡ ´±g@x
¤
@Pl
= 0; (21)
and, eliminating @x
¤
@Pl
, we get an equality:
F ´ ¡(2Py + b+ c®2±2)x¤ + a¡ Pz± + Pr®± ¡ µ(1¡ ®)± ¡ ´± = 0: (22)
This equality implicitly determines the relationships between the socially optimal land¯ll
tax, P ¤l , and respective exogenous variables.
Then, we can insert the speci¯c functions above into (12), (13) and (14) to obtain the
equilibrium values of all the endogenous variables. Especially, for the sake of manipulating
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(22), we derive:
x¤ =
¡Pz± + ®±(Pr + Pl) + a
2Py + c®2±2 + b
; (23)
and
@x¤
@Pl
=
®±
2Py + c®2±2 + b
: (24)
Let us now consider how P ¤l needs to change in response to an increase in the social
cost of land¯ll waste. Given (22), denoting the optimal value of Pl by P
¤
l and totally
di®erentiating the equation with respect to P ¤l and µ yield:
@P ¤l
@µ
= ¡
@F
@µ
@F
@Pl¤
=
®¡ 1
®
< 0: (25)
From (25), we can immediately obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4. When the social cost of land¯ll waste increases, the optimal land¯ll tax
decreases.
This proposition implies that, when the social cost of land¯ll waste is increasing, the
level of the land¯ll tax should be decreasing. Indeed, the sign of
@P ¤l
@µ
is predictable from
Proposition 2 above: as the social cost of land¯ll waste increases, the land¯ll tax must be
lowered to reduce the amount of land¯ll waste. If the further accumulation of the waste
leads to an increase in the marginal social cost of the land¯ll over time, the optimal level
of land¯ll tax needs to decrease accordingly.
6 Concluding Remarks
In light of the recent policy trend in the UK, our comparative statics analysis focuses on
the e®ects of an increase in the required recycling rate and an increase in the land¯ll tax
on equilibrium outcomes. Our results show that requiring a higher recycling rate reduces
land¯ll waste while this can negatively a®ect the overall recycling level. Our analytical
result also indicates that a higher land¯ll tax actually increases the amount of land¯ll
waste, which raises a suspicion that the continuous increase in the land¯l tax level, as we
are witnessing in the UK, might be o®setting the favorable e®ect of the PRN scheme in
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terms of reducing the land¯ll waste. At least, we need to be aware of the fact that these
two policy measures are not necessarily complementary for this particular objective.
Admittedly, there are several interesting features in the packaging waste recycling
system in the UK that we must leave out of this paper for simplicity. These include the
development of the secondary PRN market and the PERN market, and the possibility
of a strong market power possessed by some compliance schemes in the PRN market.
Especially the latter consideration would directly a®ects the results of our analysis. Al-
though the e®ects of such a market distortion seem rather insigni¯cant so far (Salmons,
2002), this particular concern is often raised against the Producer Responsibility Organi-
zation in Germany (Lehmann, 2004, and Fleckinger and Glachant, 2010) and it would be
worthwhile to explore the e®ects of non-competitive market structures in a future study.
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Appendix: Comparative Statics Results
Based on the system of equations, (12), (13), and (14), we can obtain the so-called
comparative statics equation for the base model as follows:24 ¡Pyf 00(x¤) 1 ¡®±u00(x¤) ¡1 0
¡c00(®±x¤)®± 0 1
3524dx¤dP ¤x
dP ¤n
35 =
24 P ¤n±d®0
c00(®±x¤)±x¤d®¡ dPl ¡ dPr
35 ;
where the determinant of the Jacobian matrix, J , can be found as:¯¯
J
¯¯
= Pyf
00(x¤) + c00(®±x¤)®2±2 ¡ u00(x¤) > 0: (A1)
Given (A1) and the assumptions on the household's utility and ¯rm's production functions
described in the text, we can obtain the following comparative statics results with respect
to the three di®erent types of economic instruments:
@x¤
@®
=
¡P ¤n± ¡ c00(®±x¤)®±2x¤¯¯
J
¯¯ < 0; (A2)
@P ¤x
@®
=
¡u00(x¤)c00(®±x¤)®±2x¤ ¡ u00(x¤)P ¤n±¯¯
J
¯¯ > 0; (A3)
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@P ¤n
@®
=
Pyf
00(x¤)c00(®±x¤)±x¤ ¡ P ¤n±c00(®±x¤)®±2 ¡ u00(x¤)c00(®±x¤)±x¤¯¯
J
¯¯ ; (A4)
@x¤
@Pl
=
®±¯¯
J
¯¯ > 0; (A5)
@P ¤x
@Pl
=
®±u00(x¤)¯¯
J
¯¯ < 0; (A6)
@P ¤n
@Pl
=
¡Pyf 00(x¤) + u00(x¤)¯¯
J
¯¯ < 0; (A7)
@x¤
@Pr
=
®±¯¯
J
¯¯ > 0; (A8)
@P ¤x
@Pr
=
®±u00(x¤)¯¯
J
¯¯ < 0; (A9)
@P ¤n
@Pr
=
¡Pyf 00(x¤) + u00(x¤)¯¯
J
¯¯ < 0: (A10)
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